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Abstract. In this paper we propose to draw a link from the quantitative
notion of coherence, previously used to evaluate rival scientiﬁc theories,
to legal reasoning. We evaluate the stories of the plaintiﬀ and the defen-
dant in a legal case as rival theories by measuring how well they cohere
when accounting for the evidence. We show that this gives rise to a for-
malized comparison between rival cases that account for the same set of
evidence, and provide a possible explanation as to why judgements may
favour one side over the other. We illustrate our approach by applying
it to a known legal dispute from the literature.
Keywords: legal argument, legal justiﬁcation, theory construction, co-
herence.
1 Introduction
In legal disputes each side present their case before the court, outlining the
issues, positions, and arguments taken with respect to the issues. The “story”
is supported by evidence, which is sometimes explicitly sought by the judge as
burden of proof. Each side must explain how the evidence ﬁts their story, though
there may be elements of their story that for some reason cannot be veriﬁed by
evidence or empirical testing.
Similarly in the philosophy of science, rival, possibly incompatible scientiﬁc
theories must also account for all observations, but empirical testing cannot
always be used to diﬀerentiate or rank theories, as they make the same empirical
claims. One possible measure to evaluate theories is how coherent a theory is in
accounting for a given set of observations.
We propose to draw parallels from this notion of coherence to legal reasoning,
where we view the cases of the plaintiﬀ and the defendant in a legal dispute as
rival theories, and evaluate the cases by measuring how coherent the stories are
in their account for the evidence. Intuitively, just as a good scientiﬁc theory uses
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only a few credible postulates to explain a large body of evidence, a good “story”
in a legal case must account for the evidence using only a few minor assumptions.
This provide an alternative view on how the cases can be evaluated and decided,
and provides a possible explanation as to why judgements may favour one side
over the other, in a formal and structured manner.
The notion of coherence in regard to legal justiﬁcation is well explored by
Hage [3] and Amaya [1]. Equally, there is abundant literature on abductive rea-
soning with respect to the evidence and the burden of proof by Prakken et al. [10]
and Satoh et al. [11]. However, the existing literature on coherence is mostly con-
cerned with how a decision can cohere with current law and cases, whereas we
are interested in the overall picture of how the “story” of the plaintiﬀ/defendant
coheres with the evidence.
In this paper we introduce the notion of coherence in the form proposed by
Kwok et al. [5, 6] for evaluating scientiﬁc theories. We then propose a possible
scheme based on the previous work by Kwok et al. [5, 6] for evaluating the
coherence of cases in a legal dispute. This is followed by an example of applying
our theory to an actual legal dispute previously formalized by Prakken [8]. In
conclusion, we discuss what is implied by our coherence measure and possible
future directions of this work.
2 Coherence of Theories
Traditionally in the philosophy of science, coherence has always been a criterion
in evaluating the quality of scientiﬁc theories. The extent of coherence of a theory
depends on informal, qualitative notions such as “brevity”, “predictive scope”
and “tightness of coupling” of the components of the theory.
Kwok et al. [5] proposed a quantitative measure of coherence based on the
average utilization of formulas in accounting for observations. Their later work,
Kwok et al. [6], better mirrored scientiﬁc practice by introducing input and
output sets. The proposed measure facilitates the testing of theories with exper-
iments that have varying inputs and outputs, where each theory is expressed as
a set of clauses.
When performing a scientiﬁc experiment we provide a certain input I and
observe a certain output O. It is then the objective of a theory T to explain how
the input leads to the output. For example, in an experiment verifying the theory
of gravity, the input being an object dropped in vacuum, the output would be
the measured velocity of the object some time after the drop and the theory
provides a link between the input and output. In this section we summarize the
approach developed by Kwok et al. [6].
Deﬁnition 1 (Support Sets). Given an input set I, an output set O, a subset
of the theory T being Γ . Then, Γ is a I-relative support set of O if:
1. Γ ∧ I |= O and
2. Γ is minimal (wrt set inclusion).
Evaluating Cases in Legal Disputes as Rival Theories 61
Support sets are the building blocks of the coherence measure. They are the
formulas that account for a particular observation for a given input. We denote
S(T, I,O) to be the family of all I-relative support sets for O.
Deﬁnition 2 (Utility of a formula). Given an input set I, an output set O
and a theory T . For a formula α ∈ T , the utility of α with respect to T, I,O is
given by:
U(α, T, I, O) =
| {Γ : α ∈ Γ and Γ ∈ S(T, I,O)} |
| S(T, I,O) | if S(T, I,O) = ∅
The support sets give rise to the deﬁnition of the utility of a formula of the
theory. Informally, this is the relative frequency of occurrence of formula α in
the support sets of T, I,O. This reﬂects the contribution of α in T to account
for the pair (I,O).
Deﬁnition 3 (Coherence of a Theory). The coherence of a theory T with
formulas {α1, . . . , αn} with respect to input observations I = {I1, . . . , Im} and
output observations O = {O1, . . . , Om} is:
C(T, I,O) =
1
mn
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
U(αi, T, Ij , Oj)
The coherence of a theory is the average utility of the theory’s formulas in ac-
counting for all the observations from possibly multiple experiments. This mea-
sure has been shown by Kwok et. al. [6] to demolish Craig’s trick as shown by
Craig [2], where empirical observations are simply added to the theory as excep-
tions. They showed that such handling of exceptions results in the formulation
of highly incoherent theories, since the measure favours theories in which a small
subset of the theory accounts for a large body of evidence.
3 Evaluating Legal Cases
In this section, we draw a link from scientiﬁc disputes between rival theories to
ordinary legal disputes between the cases of the plaintiﬀ and the defendant. We
treat the “stories” given from both sides as rival theories, each of which can be
tested against the evidence presented to the court. Just as scientiﬁc theories can
be tested over multiple experiments, a case in a legal dispute can be tested by
multiple pieces of evidence and testimonies.
In the following sections we will show how the analogy can be made. Our
approach enables us to evaluate the coherence of a case by measuring how well
the components of the case are utilized when accounting for the evidence and
testimonies presented to the court. We assume that all the components of the
sets mentioned in the following subsections are in clausal form.
62 P. Stenetorp and J.J. Li
3.1 Inputs
The presentation of evidence and testimonies can be viewed as experiments
testing the theory. Hence the input of the experiments are the relevant laws and
the mutually accepted state of aﬀairs that are necessary for the theory to entail
the output. Laws themselves can not be disputed although their validity for a
certain case may very well be questioned.
A mutually accepted state of aﬀairs is a state of aﬀairs that is presented
by some participant of the trial, but is not contested by any other partici-
pant. This notion is the same as the view on common knowledge given in Wal-
ton and Macagno [12]. It can thus be deemed that a mutually accepted state
of aﬀairs can be regarded as a fact from which one may draw conclusions or
aid arguments, even though the truth of such a state of aﬀairs is never proven
explicitly to the court. We relax the requirement on inputs to include laws and
facts that are not used in deriving the output, as they do not aﬀect the utility of
any component of the theory, and hence have no eﬀect on measuring coherence.
3.2 Outputs
The outputs are the evidence and testimonies presented to the court. They
pose the main problem for any theory since it must explain how an output can
be explained using the theory itself and the inputs mentioned in the previous
section.
Both the plaintiﬀ and the defendant must account for the observations in the
output such as why certain DNA is present at the crime scene, why the witness
x testify that y loaned equipment to z. Without explaining such circumstances
a case may not be considered to fulﬁl the requirements of the court.
3.3 Theory
The theory in the case of a legal dispute is the “story” that is told by one of the
sides. It may contain several components to explain the evidence presented to
the court, and why the desired outcome holds for the plaintiﬀ or the defendant.
The requirement to hold the sought outcome becomes obvious: if one considers
the “story”, it must in some way justify the conclusion the side hopes for or
nothing can be gained from the trial.
The two theories, while arguing for diﬀerent outcomes, will have to take into
account the same laws and mutually accepted state of aﬀairs, which in our
framework corresponds to the inputs. But they must also account for the same
evidence and testimonies put forth to the court, in our framework the outputs.
Making the assumption that they both account for all the facts they are clearly
rival theories that account for the same set of evidence but must somehow be
diﬀerentiated regarding how well they do so.
3.4 Support Sets and Coherence
For our measure of coherence we need to observe the I-relative support set for
the outputs O that is a subset of the theory that accounts for a particular piece
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of evidence Oi given input Ii. The relative frequency of a component of the
theory appearing in the support sets give rise to the utility of the component,
where coherence is measured as the average utility of the components over all
the given evidence.
Intuitively, the support set for a given piece of evidence is how the plain-
tiﬀ/defendant explain that piece of evidence with respect to the mutually ac-
cepted state of aﬀairs and relevant laws presented before the court. The coher-
ence of the theory measures how well the overall “story” of the plaintiﬀ and
the defendant explains all the evidence. Any theory that assumes freely without
proper support will thus be punished with lower coherence than a theory which
can utilize a small amount of assumptions in combination with the inputs to
account for a larger body of evidence.
4 Example
As an example of how our notion of coherence can be applied in order to evaluate
rival legal cases between a plaintiﬀ and a defendant, we apply it to a known legal
dispute ﬁrst formalized by Prakken [8].
Unlike Prakken [8] we simplify the case into sets of clauses to form the basis
of the judgement rather than utilizing an argumentation framework to focus on
the process of the trial. We will attempt to stay consistent with as much of the
previous formalization as possible, diﬀering only when our notion of coherence
and our focus on the judgement rather than the process forces us to do so.
4.1 The Dispute
The legal case formalized by Prakken [8] is a Dutch civil case from 1978, con-
cerning the ownership of a moveable good, a large tent. The owner of the tent,
Mr. van der Velde, put the tent up for sale at the price of 850 Gulden (approx.
380 Euro). Mr. Nieborg, who was a friend of Mr. van der Velde, said that he was
interested in buying the tent but could not aﬀord it. Mr. van der Velde made the
tent available to Mr. Nieborg, who in return helped Mr. van der Velde to paint
his house. Also, Mrs. Nieborg helped Mrs. van der Velde with her domestic work
for some time.
Later, Mr. Nieborg claimed that he and his wife had performed enough work
for Mr. and Mrs. van der Velde to cover the cost of the tent, thus implicitly
claiming that he had now become the legitimate owner of the tent. This angered
Mr. van der Velde since he perceived the work performed by Mr. and Mrs.
Nieborg as an expression of gratitude for allowing them to use the tent as a loan.
He immediately demanded that Mr. Nieborg would return the tent. When his
demands were not met, Mr. van der Velde, with assistance, threw Mr. Nieborg’s
son, who was the person currently occupying the tent, out of the tent and took
possession of it.
Some time later, Mr. van der Velde sold the tent to a Mr. van der Weg. Mr.
van der Weg paid for the tent by performing work, which was similar to the work
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performed earlier by Mr. and Mrs. Nieborg, for Mr. van der Velde. Mr. Nieborg
took his case against Mr. van der Weg to court within a period of time which was
less than three years after the repossession of the tent carried out by Mr. van der
Velde, a fact that should be noted due to implications in regard to Dutch law.
We present the cases of both Mr. Nieborg and Mr. van der Weg in clausal
form. In order to make our clauses as brief as possible, we abbreviate the names
of the people as presented in Table 1. We also abbreviate the relevant points in
time as presented in Table 2. Both sets of abbreviations conform to those used
by Prakken [8]. To make the feel of the running text more natural, we will still
make use of the full names and points in time.
Table 1. Abbreviations for the participants of the trial
Surname Abbreviation Role
Mr. Nieborg N Plaintiﬀ
Mr. van der Weg vdW Defendant
Mr. van der Velde vdV Witness
Mr. Sluis S Witness
Mr. Galtema G Witness
Table 2. Abbreviations for the points in time relevant to the trial
Point in time Event
t1 N held the tent
t2 Violent events between vdV and N
t3 Time of the trial
4.2 Inputs – Relevant Laws, Mutually Accepted State of Aﬀairs
and Consequences
We will in this section present the relevant laws, mutually accepted state of
aﬀairs and consequences, all of which will be presented in clausal form as well as
informally in the running text. These clauses will serve as input to be utilized by
the respective theories in order to derive the evidence and testimonies which we
will refer to as output. This derivation will be done using the theory itself and a
subset of the input clauses. The clauses are partially those found in Prakken [8],
but with some additions.
One diﬀerence to Prakken [8] is that we only consider the law, mutually ac-
cepted state of aﬀairs and consequences that are relevant to the ﬁnal juridical
judgement. This diﬀerence is due to our focus on the ﬁnal judgement rather than
the process of the trial itself as is the case with an argument framework, thus we
can disregard of a more general law that is later refuted in favour of one which
for our case applies more speciﬁcally. We will point out these special cases when
presenting the clauses.
Evaluating Cases in Legal Disputes as Rival Theories 65
All laws formalized here were in eﬀect at the time of the trial. Also, just as in
Prakken [8] we do not motivate the notion of persistence of ownership that Mr.
Nieborg implicitly uses to justify that he indeed is still the owner of the tent at
the time of the trial, since according to him no change in ownership has taken
place since he took possession of the tent from Mr. van der Velde.
Hold(N,Tent, t2) (1)
Hold(vdW, Tent, t3) (2)
The ﬁrst two clauses, 1 and 2, concerns the holder of the tent at diﬀerent points
in time. Clause 1, that Mr. Nieborg held the tent at the time it was taken from
him. Clause 2, that Mr. van der Weg now holds the tent. Both parties agrees
upon these state of aﬀairs.
Loan(x, y) → TestimonyLoan(z, x, y)∧ (x = z) (3)
FalseT estimonyLoan(x)→ TestimonyLoan(x, y, z)∧ (x = y) (4)
V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y) ∧ (y = z) (5)
FalseT estimonyV iolence(x) → TestimonyV iolence(x, y, z) ∧ (x = z) (6)
The next set of clauses, clause 3 to clause 6, lays forth the logic concerning
testimonies, it should be noted that we assume a primitive notion of lying to
simplify our set of clauses. It should also be noted that these clauses have no
temporal components, as we previously saw for clauses 1 and 2, the reasoning
behind this is that the testimonies and events in our particular case do not need
any temporal components due to them occurring only once. These four clauses
can not be refuted logically and have to be accepted by all parties.
Clause 3 and 5 simply state that if a person x borrowed an item y or violence
was inﬂicted by a person x towards person y, then a third person z can deliver a
testimony of the event. Clause 4 and 6 provide an alternate mode for explaining
each testimony. If a witness is lying, then he would deliver the same testimony
that a witness who had observed the events would have delivered.
Hold(x, y, t) ∧ ¬Loan(x, y) → Possess(x, y, t) (7)
Clause 7 is a formalization of Dutch law 590 BW. The loan condition is a sim-
pliﬁcation of the actual text that states that the holder may not be holding it
for another person, this change is made to make the clause simpler since holding
the item can be derived from a loan in our speciﬁc case. The loan condition is an
exception added to the more general version of the law that lacks this condition,
but since for our case the loan condition is relevant, we observe the more speciﬁc
law. This constraint makes it possible to disregard the notion of law precedence
in Prakken [8] and is justiﬁed by us only observing the judgement.
Possess(x, y, t) → GoodFaith(x, y, t) (8)
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Possess(x, y, t) ∧ GoodFaith(x, y, t) ∧Owner(z, y, t′) ∧ (x = z)
∧ InvoluntaryLoss(z, y, t′) ∧ (t′ − t) < 3 years
→ ¬Owner(x, y, t) (9)
Clause 8 is a formalization of Dutch law 589 BW which states that a possessor
is presumed to be a possessor of good faith. Clause 9 is a formalization of Dutch
law 2014 BW regarding the possession of a good. It covers the special case that
x can not be the owner of y if it has occurred an involuntary loss of y from a
previous owner z at a time t′. It also contains the restriction that a maximum
of three years must have passed since the time of the involuntary loss t′ and the
current point in time t.
4.3 Evidence Presented
This section covers all irrefutable evidence presented to the court, these are facts
that must be accounted for by any theory in order for a case to be considered
valid. This can be done by utilizing a subset of a theory, by calling upon law
and/or mutually accepted state of aﬀairs, as presented in section 4.2. The set of
all evidence clauses is referred to as the output set O.
O1 = TestimonyLoan(vdV,N, T ent) (10)
O2 = TestimonyLoan(G,N, T ent) (11)
O3 = TestimonyLoan(S,N, T ent) (12)
O4 = TestimonyV iolence(vdV, vdV,N) (13)
O5 = TestimonyV iolence(G, vdV,N) (14)
O6 = TestimonyV iolence(S, vdV,N) (15)
Clauses 10 to 15 are all testimonies delivered to the court. That the testimonies
took place is irrefutable, but the fact of them taking place has to be explained
by each theory presented in the next two sections 4.4 and 4.5.
To simplify our clauses we have taken the liberty of stating that the testi-
monies of violence implied violence towards Mr. Nieborg. In reality the involved
party was Mr. Nieborg’s son. We have also done the same regarding the tes-
timony of the tent being a loan, what was presented in reality was that Mr.
Nieborg expressed gratitude towards Mr. van der Velde for being able to hold
the tent for a limited time. This was observed by the witnesses, who gave tes-
timonies to that eﬀect. As described by Prakken [8] the violence towards Mr.
Nieborg’s son counts as violence towards Mr. Nieborg when legally proving that
the loss was involuntary and the expression of gratitude observed by the three
witnesses counts as the possession of the tent being perceived as a loan. We have
once again simply left out these conclusions and replaced them with the results
relevant to the judgement.
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4.4 The Plaintiﬀ’s Case
To make a case, each party x must construct an input set Ix which consists
of input subsets Ixi corresponding with the observation Oi presented in the
previous section. The clauses of each subset Ixi are clauses from section 4.2,
being formalizations of mutually accepted state of aﬀairs and law.
Each party x also needs to produce a theory Tx representing his “story”, that
together with the input subset Ixi will explain the corresponding observation
Oi. A theory may consist of any clauses, as long as it satisﬁes the previously
mentioned condition to satisfy each Oi by using Ixi as input.
TP1 = V iolence(vdV,N, t2) (16)
TP2 = FalseT estimonyLoan(vdV ) (17)
TP3 = FalseT estimonyLoan(G) (18)
TP4 = FalseT estimonyLoan(S) (19)
TP5 = ¬Loan(N,Tent) (20)
The ﬁrst clause of the plaintiﬀ’s theory TP , clause 16, is an acceptance of the
violent events when the possession of the tent was revoked by Mr. van der Velde
since this plays in his favour. However, he is forced to add clauses 17 to 19 since
he is unwilling to accept that his work was an expression of gratitude, which was
how it was perceived by the witnesses. Not calling the testimonies false would
render it impossible for him to claim previous possession, using law 590 BW with
its special case (clause 7) and law 589 BW (clause 8). Thus being able to revoke
the current hold of the tent by van der Weg using law 2014 BW (clause 9) with
its exception which is his own goal and his theory must thus account for this.
Clause 20 is included since it is a requirement for him to be able to use law 2014
BW (clause 9) with the special case applied.
IP1 = {FalseT estimonyLoan(x)→ TestimonyLoan(x, y, z)∧ (x = y)} (21)
IP2 = {FalseT estimonyLoan(x)→ TestimonyLoan(x, y, z)∧ (x = y)} (22)
IP3 = {FalseT estimonyLoan(x)→ TestimonyLoan(x, y, z)∧ (x = y)} (23)
IP4 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y) ∧ (y = z)} (24)
IP5 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y) ∧ (y = z)} (25)
IP6 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y) ∧ (y = z)} (26)
Since it is an important point, we will once again stress that the input set Ix,
unlike the theory set Tx, has the restriction that it can only consist of laws
and mutually accepted state of aﬀairs. This has signiﬁcant consequences for our
notion of coherence, which we will observe in the coming sections.
For his input set IP the plaintiﬀ alternates between clause 4 that implies
that a testimony is a lie and clause 5 that implies that a testimony is accurate.
This in combination with his theory TP is enough to prove each Oi using the
corresponding IPi, thus completing his task.
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4.5 The Defendant’s Case
The defendant’s case is very similar to that of the plaintiﬀ which we presented
in the previous section. But the minute diﬀerences will have eﬀects on how it
interacts with our notion of coherence.
TD1 = V iolence(vdV,N, t2) (27)
TD2 = Loan(N,Tent) (28)
In his theory TD, the defendant has no need to discredit the violent events taking
place since they are neutral towards his goal of ownership when interacting with
the laws contained in I. This is done by concurring with the violent events, just
as the plaintiﬀ did in clause 16 which corresponds to the defendant’s clause 27.
In order to fulﬁl his goal of ownership the defendant simply has to assume
that the testimonies regarding the loan are accurate, as is done in clause 28.
This will make his theory capable of justifying his ownership of the tent since the
attempts by the plaintiﬀ to claim ownership using law 2014 BW (clause 9) with
its exception, since law 590 BW with its exception (clause 7) is not applicable if
the plaintiﬀ was given the tent on loan.
ID1 = {Loan(x, y) → TestimonyLoan(z, x, y)∧ (x = z)} (29)
ID2 = {Loan(x, y) → TestimonyLoan(z, x, y)∧ (x = z)} (30)
ID3 = {Loan(x, y) → TestimonyLoan(z, x, y)∧ (x = z)} (31)
ID4 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y)∧ (y = z)} (32)
ID5 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y)∧ (y = z)} (33)
ID6 = {V iolence(x, y) → TestimonyV iolence(z, x, y)∧ (y = z)} (34)
Just like the plaintiﬀ, the defendant alternates between two clauses when con-
structing his input set ID, in this case clauses 5 and 3, both implying that the
testimonies of the witnesses are true and are thus indications of a loan and a
violent event taking place. He has thus also fulﬁlled his obligations.
4.6 Calculation of Coherence
We will now proceed to calculate the coherence of the “stories” given by the
plaintiﬀ and defendant using our measure of coherence introduced in section 3.
For the six observations O : {O1, . . . , O6}, the plaintiﬀ’s theory TP contains
ﬁve clauses, whereas the the defendant’s theory TD contains two clauses. The
support sets for the evidence from both sides are as noted in table 3. We remind
the reader that a support set is the subset of a theory that is utilized to account
for a given observation.
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Table 3. Support sets for the observations
Observation Plaintiﬀ support set Defendant support set
O1 {TP5, TP2} {TD2}
O2 {TP5, TP3} {TD2}
O3 {TP5, TP4} {TD2}
O4 {TP5, TP1} {TD1}
O5 {TP5, TP1} {TD1}
O6 {TP5, TP1} {TD1}
We remind ourselves that as described in section 4.4 and 4.5, TP and TD are
comprised as shown in equation 35 and 36.
TP = {TP1, TP2, TP3, TP4, TP5} (35)
TD = {TD1, TD2} (36)
The summation of the utility of each of the components of the plaintiﬀ’s theory
TP over all observations are as shown in equation 37 to 41. These reﬂect how
much each theory component contributed in accounting for all the evidence.
6∑
j=1
U(TP1, TP , IPj , Oj) = 3 (37)
6∑
j=1
U(TP2, TP , IPj , Oj) = 1 (38)
6∑
j=1
U(TP3, TP , IPj , Oj) = 1 (39)
6∑
j=1
U(TP4, TP , IPj , Oj) = 1 (40)
6∑
j=1
U(TP5, TP , IPj , Oj) = 6 (41)
We then average the sum of all the utility of the components over the size of
the theory and the number of evidence to derive the coherence measure. The
calculation is described in equation 42.
C(TP , I, O) =
1
6
× 1
5
× (3 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 6) = 0.4 (42)
For the case of the defendant, there are only two parts to his story. The sum-
mation of the utility of each of the components in the defendant’s theory over
all observations are as follows.
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6∑
j=1
U(TD1, TD, IDj , Oj) = 3 (43)
6∑
j=1
U(TD2, TD, IDj , Oj) = 3 (44)
The coherence of the defendant’s theory can be derived as is done in equation 45.
C(TD, I, O) =
1
6
× 1
2
× (3 + 3) = 0.5 (45)
Our coherence measure shows that in this event where the explanations from
both sides are considered equally valid, the defendant had provided a more co-
herent theory to account for the evidence.
The example illustrates a possible application of our notion of coherence in
a legal dispute. Both sides were capable of producing a story explaining the
evidence, but one did so better than the other as it provided a simpler account
for the evidence. This is reﬂected in the higher coherence value derived from the
explanations of the defendant compared to that of the plaintiﬀ. In the following
section we will discuss the merits and the shortcomings of this approach in
evaluating cases in legal disputes, and identify possible lines of future work.
5 Discussion and Future Work
We proposed an approach to evaluate cases in a legal dispute as two rivaling sci-
entiﬁc theories. The theories are measured by how well they account for the evi-
dence. The proposed measure of coherence rewards simple theories that account
for a large body of evidence, while punishing frivolous theories that regard much
of the evidence as exceptions. We gave an example of a known legal dispute from
the literature, and showed how the case ﬁts into our framework. In the example,
the side that lost due to insuﬃcient evidence also had the less coherent theory.
We note that a key diﬀerence between scientiﬁc theories and cases in legal
disputes is that scientiﬁc theories are evaluated primarily on how well they ac-
count for the evidence, whereas cases in legal disputes are ultimately concerned
with proving a case in order to attain a goal. However, as the case is based on
evidence, the quality of the theory in accounting for the evidence is still crucial
when proving the case. We argue that our notion of coherence gives rise to an
important measure to the quality of a case, and allow rival cases to be compared
in a quantitative manner.
Our framework provides only a preliminary and approximate model for evalu-
ating cases with respect to the given evidence. We intentionally chose to simplify
the example to illustrate our goal of assessing the coherence of rival theories be-
tween the plaintiﬀ and the defendant. In more complicated real-life examples, not
all evidence is treated equally, some would be considered worthy of more merit
than others, and some would be contradictory. The quality of explanations in
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accounting for a single piece of evidence can also be subjected to debate. The dif-
fering merits of evidence and explanations can be modelled by allocating weights
to the evidence and also components of the theory in a way similar to the pro-
posal made by Li et al. [7]. The merit of cases would then be dependent to the
weights associated with each evidence and their explanations. This would be one
possible line of future work, but it is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Our measure does not take into account that parts of a chain of conclusion
interacts and the ﬁnal conclusion in such a chain depends on the probability
of the chain as a whole. This fact has been noted in Keppens [4]. Our measure
does, however, capture the eﬀect of corroboratory evidence as described in Wal-
ton and Reed [13], since a theory that can account for corroborating accounts
of the same observation using only a few clever assumptions in combination
with law and common knowledge will be considered “better” according to our
measure. Contradictory evidence could be handled by argument-based version of
extended logic programming with defeasible priorities such as the one proposed
by Prakken and Sartor [9]. Incorporating these features into the evaluation of
coherence is essential for extending our proposal to more complex legal disputes.
Our evaluation of coherence reﬂects the importance of the choice of evidence in
a legal dispute. As the evidence in a legal dispute is essential for our calculation
of coherence of the respective cases, diﬀerent selection of evidence can change
the theories, thus leading to diﬀerent outcomes in accordance with our coherence
measure. Therefore, intelligent allocation of the burden of proof is necessary to
collect the relevant evidence in proving the cases, while avoiding material that
may not necessarily relate to the case.
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